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UNITED STATES V. SIMON AND THE NEW
CERTIFICATION PROVISIONS
CHRISTIAN J. MIXTERt
INTRODUCTION

The Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 20021 (the "Act") contains two
well-publicized provisions requiring that Chief Executive
Officers (CEO's) and Chief Financial Officers (CFO's) of public
companies certify their companies' Securities and Exchange
Commission (SEC) filings.
Section 906 provides that each
periodic report filed by an issuer with the SEC shall be
accompanied by a written statement by the CEO and the CFO
certifying that the report "fully complies with the requirements
of section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934
(the "Exchange Act") 2 and that information contained in the
periodic report fairly presents, in all material respects, the
3
financial condition and results of operations of the issuer."
Section 302 mandates that the SEC issue rules requiring that
the CEO and CFO of each company that files reports under
section 13(a) or 15(d) shall certify a number of facts, includingin section 302(a)(3)-that based on the officer's knowledge, "the
financial statements, and other financial information included in
the report, fairly present in all material respects the financial
condition and results of operations of the issuer as of, and for,
4
the periods presented in the report."
Now that the SEC has issued rules that enable section 302
to go into effect, 5 the principal difference between the section 906
f The author is a partner at Morgan, Lewis & Bockius LLP, Washington, D.C.
1 Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745.
2 15 U.S.C. §§ 78m, 78o(d) (2000).
3 Sarbanes-Oxley Act § 906(b) (to be codified at 18 U.S.C. § 1350).
4 Sarbanes-Oxley Act § 302(a)(2) (to be codified at 15 U.S.C. § 7241).
5 Certification of Disclosure in Companies' Quarterly and Annual Reports,
Release Nos. 33-8124, 34-46427, IC-25722, Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH)
86,720, at
86,126 (Aug. 28, 2002) [hereinafter Certification Release].
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certification and the section 302(a)(3) certification is the fact that
the section 906 certification applies not only to the financial
statements and other financial information contained in the
report, but to all the information presented in the report.6 More
interesting is what sections 906 and 302(a)(3) have in common:
the fact that false statements in either certification can be
prosecuted criminally, 7 and the fact that they share a
standardless requirement of "fair presentation" that is not
limited to the traditional benchmark that financial statements
fairly present the financial affairs of the issuer "in accordance
8
with generally accepted accounting principles" (GAAP).
Was Congress's omission of any reference to GAAP in the
new certification provisions an oversight? According to the SEC,
it was quite intentional. At page 7 of its Certification Release,
the Commission stated:
The certification statement [in § 302(a)(3)] regarding fair
presentation of financial statements and other financial
information is not limited to a representation that the financial
statements and other financial information have been
presented in accordance with "generally accepted accounting
principles" and is not otherwise limited by reference to
generally accepted accounting principles. We believe that
Congress intended this statement to provide assurances that
the financial information disclosed in a report, viewed in its
entirety, meets a standard of overall material accuracy and
broader than financial reporting
completeness that is
requirements under generally accepted accounting principles.
In our view, a "fair presentation" of an issuer's financial
condition, results of operations and cash flows encompasses the
selection of appropriate accounting policies, proper application
of appropriate accounting policies, disclosure of financial
information that is informative and reasonably reflects the
underlying transactions and events and the inclusion of any
additional disclosure necessary to provide investors with a
6 See Sarbanes-Oxley Act § 906 (to be codified at 18 U.S.C. § 1530).

7 See id. at 790. Although section 302 does not contain explicit criminal
penalties, a false section 302 certification could be prosecuted as a false statement

under 18 U.S.C. § 1001 (2000).
8 § 103(a)(2)(A)(iii)(bb). Since the section 906 certification
financial information, a wholesale limitation of that section to
would not make sense in any event. Even where section 906 does
information, however, and in section 302(a)(3) which applies
information, there is no link to GAAP.

is not limited to
GAAP standards
apply to financial
only to financial
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materially accurate and complete picture of an issuer's
financial condition, results of operations and cash flows. 9

In a supporting footnote to the passage quoted above, the
SEC explained that "[piresenting financial information in
conformity with generally accepted accounting principles may
not necessarily satisfy obligations under the antifraud provisions
of the federal securities laws." 10 The precedents cited for this
proposition are United States v. Simon," In re Caterpillar,Inc.,12
and In re Edison Schools, Inc. 13

Neither In re Caterpillar,Inc. nor Edison Schools, Inc. was
brought under the antifraud provisions; they were reporting
cases brought under section of the Exchange Act. 14 Moreover,
both were settled cases that did not test in the crucible of
litigation the "broader" disclosure standard that the SEC has
now enunciated. The only litigated fraud case in the group,
United States v. Simon, is a throwback to the 1960s-the last

great phase of expansionist judicial opinions in the securities
field. This Article attempts briefly to put Simon in its temporal
context and then examines what Simon actually teaches about
the permissible scope of the new certification requirements.
9 Certification Release, supra note 5,
10 Id. at n.55.

86, 720, at 86,131.

11 United States v. Simon, 425 F.2d 796, 806-09 (2d Cir. 1969) (finding
accountants criminally liable for falsely representing financial statements).
12 Caterpillar, Inc. Release No. 34-30532, Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) %73,830, at
63,050 (Mar. 31, 1992).
13 Edison Schools, Inc., Release No. 34-45925, 77 SEC Docket 1800, 2002 WL
1315557 (May 14, 2002).
14 15 U.S.C. § 78m (2000). Caterpillar,Inc. focused on the issuer's compliance
with the requirements for Management's Discussion and Analysis (MD&A) in Item
303 of Regulation S-K, 17 C.F.R. § 229.303, which requires the company to, among
other things, "provide such other information that the registrant believes to be
necessary to an understanding of its financial condition, changes in financial
condition and results of operations." See also Management's Discussion and
Analysis of Financial Condition and Results of Operations Release Nos. 33-6835, 3426831 (May 18, 1989). Edison Schools, likewise, was brought under the reporting,
not the antifraud provisions. The reporting provisions have long contained Rule
12b-20, 17 C.F.R. § 240.12b-20 (2002), which provides that "[in addition to the
information expressly required to be included in a statement or report, there shall
be added such further material information, if any, as may be necessary to make the
required statements, in the light of the circumstances under which they are made
not misleading." Neither the MD&A requirements nor Rule 12b-20 have
traditionally been the guideposts for liability in fraud or criminal proceedings, in
which both the scienter requirements and the consequences for a violator are far
more severe than in a case brought under the reporting rules. In this respect (as in
others), the new certification provisions are a complete departure from prior law.
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SIMON IN CONTEXT

The federal securities laws, and the attendant rules and
regulations, reflect a tension between highly specific
requirements and proscriptions similar to those that
characterize the Internal Revenue Code, and the sorts of
sweeping, goal-based mandates that appear in the Sherman Act
in the antitrust realm. This dualism has deep roots.
When Congress turned its attention to the securities
markets in the wake of the 1929 crash and in the depths of the
Great Depression, legislators were concerned that they might
not be able to anticipate the evolution of abusive conduct.
Perhaps the most famous example of this concern is Congress's
condemnation of a very specific litany of manipulative practices
in section 9(a) of the Exchange Act, 15 followed by section 10(b) of
the Exchange Act, 16 which further prohibits "any manipulative
or deceptive device or contrivance in contravention of such rules
and regulations as the SEC may prescribe as necessary or
appropriate in the public interest or for the protection of
investors" 17 (or, in the words of Thomas G. Corcoran, "Thou shalt
not devise any other cunning devices."18). The SEC's 1942
exercise of this authority in the broad language of Rule 10b-519
almost singlehandedly spawned the huge body of judge and
Commission-made "common law" that forms much of the daily
20
grist of a securities lawyer's professional life.
15 Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 9(a), 15 U.S.C. § 78i (2000) [hereinafter
Exchange Act].
16 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b).
17 Id.
18 Hearings on H.R. 7852 and H.R. 8720 Before the House Comm. on Interstate

and Foreign Commerce, 73d Cong. 115 (1934).
19 Rule 10b-5, 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2002) declares that it is unlawful for any
person:
(a) to employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud;
(b) to make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state a
material fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in the light

of the circumstances under which they were made, not misleading; or,
(c) to engage in any act, practice, or course of business which operates or
would operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person, in connection with the

purchase or sale of any security.
Id.
20 Moreover, the SEC, as an institutional plaintiff in enforcement cases, has an
interest-even if only a subconscious interest-in retaining some broad, expansive
"standards" for liability, which maximize both its regulatory flexibility and its

ability to withstand summary judgment motions that might succeed if only the
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The very breadth of section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 fueled an
expansion of securities fraud liability that continued throughout
the 1960s. Simon was a part of that expansion. 2 1 Predictably,
however, expanded litigation provoked what might be called a
politico-judicial reaction. The explosion of class action lawsuits
seeking damages in more and more creative ways (for example,
where the plaintiff did not purchase or sell the security in
question, or where the defendant was merely negligent or was at
most a "helper" in an alleged violation), as well as innovative law
enforcement actions that carried with them the threat of
professional death to the defendants involved, led the Supreme
Court to hand down a series of decisions between 1975 and 1994
that adopted a "strict statutory construction" approach to the
securities laws. 22 When these decisions did not adequately stem
defendant had a plain target at which to aim.
21 The Second Circuit's opinion in Simon was written by Judge Henry J.
Friendly. For an exhaustive discussion of Judge Friendly's impact on the securities
law of his day, see Margaret V. Sachs, Judge Friendly and the Law of Securities
Regulation: The Creation of a JudicialReputation, 50 SMU L. REV. 777 (1997). In
the 1960s, the world was also a different place in the realm of the criminal law. At
the outset of his opinion in Simon, Judge Friendly wrote:
While every criminal conviction is important to the defendant, there is a
special poignancy and a corresponding responsibility on reviewing judges
when, as here, the defendants have been men of blameless lives and
respected members of a learned profession.... This is no less true because
the trial judge, wisely in our view, imposed no prison sentences.
United States v. Simon, 425 F.2d 796, 798-99 (2d Cir. 1969). Such judicial solicitude
seems almost quaint today in the wake of the Sentencing Guidelines and the
draconian criminal penalties enacted by the Act.
22 See Central Bank of Denver v. First Interstate Bank of Denver, 511 U.S. 164,
191 (1994) (explaining that section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 do not support claims
against aiders and abettors); Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646, 667 (1983) (finding that no
insider trading liability unless the information has been obtained in breach of a
duty of trust or confidence); Aaron v. SEC, 446 U.S. 680, 701-02 (1980) (holding
that SEC must show scienter in enforcement actions brought under section 10(b)
and Rule 10b-5); Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222, 235 (1980) (finding that
nondisclosure liability must be premised on a duty to speak); Santa Fe Indus. v.
Green, 430 U.S. 462, 478 (1977) (holding that securities laws do not permit recovery
for corporate mismanagement); Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 212
(1976) (private plaintiffs under section 10(b) and Rule lOb-5 must plead and prove
that the defendant acted with scienter); Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores,
421 U.S. 723, 754-55 (1975) (standing for private plaintiffs under section 10(b) and
Rule lOb-5 limited to purchasers and sellers of securities). Recent years, however,
have seen two Supreme Court decisions that take a more generous approach toward
the government's securities law enforcement efforts. See SEC v. Zandford, 535 U.S.
813 (2002) (broadly construing the "in connection with" requirement of section 10(b)
and Rule 10b-5); United States v. O'Hagan, 521 U.S. 642, 665-66 (1997) (confirming
validity of "misappropriation theory" of insider trading under section 10(b) and Rule
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the tide of enhanced liability, Congress passed the Private
Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995,23 followed by the
Uniform Standards Act of 1998,24 which carved out a uniquely
complex niche for securities law plaintiffs. On a more mundane
level, the past seven decades have seen a substantial
encrustation of highly detailed rules and regulations
promulgated by the SEC, supplemented by equally detailed
pronouncements by self-regulatory bodies ranging from the
National Association of Securities Dealers to the Financial
Accounting Standards Board.
These rules are an almost
inevitable consequence of a regulatory system that is
administered and implemented by lawyers and accountants, who
are inveterate tinkerers and often share a strong desire for
certainty in the form of highly specific rules, which (in the short
run, at least) make it easier both to enforce the law and to advise
clients.
Early in 2002, SEC Chairman Harvey Pitt resurrected
Simon in an effort to swing the pendulum away from what he
identified as an overly slavish devotion to form over substance.
Specifically, Chairman Pitt observed:
Present-day accounting standards are cumbersome and offer
far too detailed prescriptive requirements for companies and
their accountants to follow. That approach, by necessity,
encourages accountants to "check the boxes"--that is, to read
accounting principles narrowly, to ascertain whether there is
technical compliance with the applicable accounting principles.
But the first principle should always be the one Judge Henry
Friendly articulated four decades ago in the Lybrand Ross
criminal case, US v. Simon. There, in rejecting the auditors'

claim that criminal charges were foreclosed because the
financial statements literally complied with GAAP, Judge
Friendly held that, if literal compliance with GAAP creates a
fraudulent or misleading impression in the minds of
shareholders, the accountants could, and would, be held
criminally liable. 25

10b-5).
23 Pub. L. No. 104-67, 109 Stat. 737 (1995).
24 Pub. L. No. 105-353, 112 Stat. 3227 (1998).
25 Public Statement by SEC Chairman: Remarks at the Winter Bench and Bar
Conference of the Federal Bar Council at 3-4 (Feb. 19, 2002), available at
www.sec.gov/news/speech/spch.539; accord Public Statement by SEC Chairman:
Remarks at the SEC Speaks Conference at 4-5 (Feb. 22, 2002), available at
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It is time to examine whether Simon can bear the weight
that the SEC is now placing upon it.
II. WHAT DID SIMON SAY?
Carl Simon, Robert Kaiser, and Melvin Fishman were
convicted of conspiracy to violate 18 U.S.C. § 100126 (false
statements to a government agency), 18 U.S.C. § 134127 (mail
fraud), and 15 U.S.C. § 78ff28 (criminal violation of the Exchange
Act), as well as two substantive counts of mail fraud, in
connection with their respective roles as a senior partner, junior
partner, and senior associate on Lybrand, Ross Bros. &
Montgomery's audit of the financial statements of Continental
Vending Machine Corporation ("Continental").29 The thrust of
the government's case against the three auditors was that they
were aware, but failed to disclose, that $3.9 million, shown on
Continental's financial statements as loans receivable from an
affiliate named Valley Commercial Corporation ("Valley"), were
uncollectable because Valley had in turn loaned approximately
the same amount to Harold Roth, Continental's President. Roth
was unable to repay the loan and belatedly "secured" his
obligation to Valley with collateral that consisted mostly of
Continental common stock. 30 The essence of the charges against
the defendants in Simon is captured below, where the actual text
of Note 2 to Continental's financial statements is compared with
what the government claimed defendants would have said if they
had disclosed everything they knew:
Note 2 as Signed Off On by Defendants
The amount receivable from Valley Commercial Corp. (an
affiliated company of which Mr. Harold Roth is an officer,
director and stockholder) bears interest at 12% a year. Such
amount, less the balance of the notes payable to that company,
is secured by the assignment to the Company of Valley's equity
in certain marketable securities. As of February 15, 1963, the
amount of such equity at current market quotations exceeded
the net amount receivable.
www.sec.gov/news/speech/spch. 540.
26
27
28

18 U.S.C. § 1001 (2000).
18 U.S.C. § 1341 (2000).
15 U.S.C. § 78ff (2000).

See United States v. Simon, 425 F.2d 796, 798 (2d Cir. 1969).
30 Id. at 799.
29

ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW

[Vol.76:699

Note 2 as the Government Would Have Had It Read
The amount receivable from Valley Commercial Corp. (an
affiliated company of which Mr. Harold Roth is an officer,
director and stockholder), which bears interest at 12% a year,
was uncollectable at September 30, 1962, since Valley had
loaned approximately the same amount to Mr. Roth who was
unable to pay. Since that date Mr. Roth and others have
pledged as security for the repayment of his obligation to Valley
and its obligation to Continental (now $3,900,000, against
which Continental's liability to Valley cannot be offset)
securities which, as of February 13, 1963, had a market value
of $2,978,000. Approximately 80% of such securities are stock
and convertible debentures of the Company.
The government also contended that by the date of the
auditors' opinion, the defendants knew or should have known
that the value of Roth's collateral amounted to only two-thirds of
31
the value stated in Continental's financials.
At their jury trial, the defendants called eight independent
accounting experts, who testified that the treatment of the
Valley receivable described in Note 2 was not inconsistent with
either GAAP or generally accepted auditing standards (GAAS),
and that neither required that the auditors disclose the make-up
of the collateral, or the fact that the receivable had increased
after the closing date of the financial statements. All eight also
testified that the Roth borrowings from Valley did not need to be
disclosed, and seven of the eight stated affirmatively that
32
disclosure would have been inappropriate.
On appeal, the defendants made two arguments based on
their accounting experts' testimony. First, they contended that
the trial judge had erred in refusing to instruct the jury that the
defendants could be found guilty only if, according to GAAP, the
financial statements as a whole did not fairly present
Continental's financial condition, and then only if the
defendants' departure from accepted professional standards was
due to willful disregard with knowledge of the statements' falsity
and intent to deceive.
The Second Circuit rejected this
argument, holding instead that the judge had properly
instructed the jury that "the 'critical test' was whether the
financial statements as a whole 'fairly presented the financial
31
32

See id. at 801.
See id. at 805.
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position of Continental as of [their date],'" and if they did not,
the issue was whether defendants had acted in good faith, as to
which proof of compliance with GAAP and GAAS was "'evidence
which may be very persuasive but not necessarily conclusive.' "33
In language that, as highlighted below, contains some important
qualifications, the appellate court said:
We do not think the jury was. .. required to accept the
accountants' evaluation whether a given fact was material to
overall fair presentation, at least not when the accountants'
testimony was not based on specific rules or prohibitions to
which they could point, but only on the need for an auditor to
make an honest judgment and their conclusion that nothing in
the financial statements themselves negated the conclusion that
an honest judgment had been made. Such evidence may be

highly persuasive, but it is not conclusive, and so the trial judge
34
correctly charged.
Defendants next attacked the verdict on the ground that the
evidence was insufficient as a matter of law to allow the jury to
consider the charges against them, particularly in light of the
expert testimony. Here, the Second Circuit focused not on the
abstract issue of whether compliance with GAAP and GAAS is a
defense, but instead on the particular fact that Continental was
being looted (in response to which, in the court of appeals' view,
GAAP and GAAS themselves required the defendants to do more
than they did):
We join defendants' counsel in assuming that the mere fact that
a company has made advances to an affiliate does not
ordinarily impose a duty on an accountant to investigate what
the affiliate has done with them or even to disclose that the
affiliate has made loan to a common officer if this has come to
his attention. But it simply cannot be true that an accountantis
under no duty to disclose what he knows when he has reason to
believe that, to a materialextent, a corporationis being operated
not to carry out its business in the interest of all the stockholders
but for the private benefit of its president. For a court to say

that all this is immaterial as a matter of law if only such loans
are thought to be collectible would be to say that independent
accountants have no responsibility to reveal known dishonesty
by a high corporate officer. If certification does not at least
imply that the corporationhas not been looted by insiders so far
33 Id. at 805-806.
34 Id. at 806 (emphasis added).

ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW

[Vol.76:699

as the accountants know, or, if it has been, that the diversion
has been made good beyond peradventure (or adequately
reserved against) and effective steps taken to prevent a
recurrence,it would mean nothing, and the reliance placed on it
by the public would be a snare and a delusion. Generally
accepted accounting principles instruct an accountant what to
do in the usual case where he has no reason to doubt that the
affairs of the corporation are being honestly conducted. Once
he has reason to believe that this basic assumption is false, an
entirely different situation confronts him.
Then, as the
Lybrand firm stated in its letter accepting the Continental
engagement, he must "extend his procedures to determine
whether or not such suspicions are justified." If as a result of
such an extension or, as here, without it, he finds his suspicions
to be confirmed, full disclosure must be the rule, unless he has
made sure the wrong has been righted and procedures to avoid
a repetition have been established. At least this must be true
when the dishonesty he has discovered is not some minor
peccadillobut a diversion so large as to imperil if not destroy the
35
very solvency of the enterprise.
The foregoing discussion suggests two important limiting
principles on Simon's holding with respect to the dispositive
nature of GAAP compliance: first, that the persuasive nature of
GAAP will vary depending on whether it explicitly supports-or,
as in Simon, simply does not prohibit-the disclosure at issue;
second, that GAAP compliance is a weak defense if the
government can show that the defendants deliberately misled
investors about an extraordinary fact, such as the looting of a
corporation by its officers, but not otherwise.
III. SIMON IN THE SECOND CIRCUIT
In the years after Simon was decided, it was cited
occasionally within the Second Circuit for the proposition that
conformity with GAAP is not dispositive of a Rule 10b-5
defendant's duty to disclose. 36 Interestingly, another holding of
Simon-that a defendant's claim he had nothing to gain from

35 Id. at 806-07 (emphasis added).

36 See Siemens Info. Sys., Inc. v. TPI Enter., [1991-1992 Transfer Binder] Fed.
Sec. L. Rep. (CCH)
96,573, at 92,662 (Mar. 12, 1992); Herzfeld v. Laventhol,
Krekstein, Horwath & Horwath, 378 F. Supp. 112, 122 (S.D.N.Y. 1974), rev'd in part
on other grounds, 540 F.2d 27, 27 (2d Cir. 1976); see also Straus v. Holiday Inns,
Inc., 460 F. Supp. 729, 736 (S.D.N.Y. 1978).
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committing securities fraud is not dispositive of his scienter if
the government can prove that he acted deliberately 37-received
somewhat more attention, forming the basis for a line of cases
holding that, even in the absence of a plausible motive on
defendant's part, a plaintiff may satisfy his obligations to plead
fraud with particularity under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
indicating conscious
circumstances
9(b) by identifying
misbehavior. 38 By their very focus on the deliberate nature of
the defendants' conduct in Simon, these cases point up the
second limitation on Simon's sweep: namely, that the Second
Circuit's holding that "GAAP compliance isn't enough" arose in a
case where the defendants were faced with evidence of actual
39
looting of the corporation.
IV. THE NINTH CIRCUIT'S VIEW
The Ninth Circuit's treatment of Simon illustrates both of
the limitations noted above. In SEC v. Arthur Young & Co.,40
the Ninth Circuit affirmed a district judge's refusal to enjoin an
accounting firm from further violations of the securities laws
despite the SEC's contention at trial that the accountants had
failed to comply with GAAS in conducting the audit at issue, and
"should have done more" to uncover their client's fraud.4 1 By the
time of its oral argument in the court of appeals, the SEC
apparently had defined "more" to mean that the auditor should
have "performed his audit functions in a manner that would
have revealed to an ordinary prudent investor, who examined
the accountant's audits or other financial statements, a
reasonably accurate reflection of the financial risks such an
investor presently bears or might bear in the future if he
invested in the audited endeavor." 42 After noting the auditing
37 See Simon, 425 F.2d at 808-10.
38 See Beck v. Manufacturers Hanover Trust Co., 820 F.2d 46, 50 (2d Cir. 1987);
Ray v. General Motors Acceptance Corp., 1995 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21467, at *15

(E.D.N.Y. Mar. 28, 1995); Tribune Co. v. Purcigliotti, 869 F. Supp. 1076, 1091
(S.D.N.Y. 1994); In re Crazy Eddie Sec. Litig., 812 F. Supp. 338, 352 (E.D.N.Y.

1993).
39 See In re Crazy Eddie Sec. Litig., 812 F. Supp. at 352 (summarizing Simon,
stating that it "affirm[ed] criminal conviction of accountants ... who knowingly
drew up and certified false and misleading corporate financial statements where

jury could find that accountants knew of looting by the corporate President").
40 590 F.2d 785 (9th Cir. 1979).
41 Id. at 787.
42 Id. at 787-88.
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firm's contention that good faith compliance with GAAS should
immunize it from liability, the Ninth Circuit rejected the SEC's
expansive view of an auditor's liability in ringing terms:
To accept the SEC's position would go far toward making the
accountant both an insurer of his client's honesty and an
enforcement arm of the SEC. We can understand why the SEC
wishes to so conscript accountants. Its frequently late arrival
on the scene of fraud and violations of securities laws almost
always suggests that had it been there earlier with the
accountant it would have caught the scent of wrong-doing and,
after an unrelenting hunt, bagged the game. What it cannot do,
the thought goes, the accountant can and should. The difficulty
with this is that Congress has not enacted the conscription bill
that the SEC seeks to have us fashion
and fix as an interpretive
43
gloss on existing securities laws.
The court of appeals responded to Simon with the following
statement:
Simon recognized that compliance with [GAAP] would not
immunize an accountant when he consciously chose not to
disclose on a financial statement a known material fact. No
such deliberate concealment was found by the trial court to
exist in this case. Thus, although we assume arguendo that
Simon strips the accountant of the protection that compliance
with GAAS (Simon, incidentally, was concerned only with
GAAP) normally affords when he fails to reveal material facts
which he knows or which, but for a deliberate refusal to become
informed, he should have known, there exists no basis in the
trial court's findings for so applying Simon. We cannot say
44
such findings in this respect are clearly erroneous.
43 Id. at 788. In the SEC's view, Congress enacted a "conscription bill" sixteen
years later when it amended the Exchange Act to add a new section 10A, 15 U.S.C.
§ 78j-1, requiring auditors to report illegal acts that they find in the course of their
audits to the client's audit committee and, in some circumstances, the SEC. See
generally Paul Huey-Burns and Liza M. Ray, The SEC's Enforcement'Programand
Section 10A, 29 SEC. REG. L.J. 199 (2001). Whether the scope of section 10A's "duty
to report" is as broad as the SEC contends is doubtful. See Thomas L. Riesenberg,
Trying to Hear the Whistle Blowing: The Widely Misunderstood 'Illegal Act'
Reporting Requirements of Exchange Act Section 1OA, 56 BUS. LAW. 1417, 1422
(2001). In any event, section 10A does not purport to expand the scope of section
10(b) or Rule 10b-5.
44 Arthur Young, 590 F.2d at 788-89 (footnote omitted). A few years later, in
SEC v. Seaboard Corp., the Ninth Circuit summarized Arthur Young as follows:
We have said that an accountant has no duty beyond compliance with
generally accepted accounting standards to ensure his client's honesty and
to enforce his client's duty with the security acts and regulations .... But
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In 2001, the Ninth Circuit was called upon to decide SEC v.
Dain Rauscher, Inc.,45 an enforcement action that arose out of
the Orange County, California financial crisis. Defendant Dain
Rauscher had acted as senior underwriter for nine municipal
note offerings, and as a senior advisor for a tenth. 46 The SEC
contended that one of Dain Rauscher's officers, Kenneth Ough,
had violated section 10(b) of the Exchange Act and Rule 10b-5,
as well as sections 17(a)(1)-(3) of the Securities Act,47 in his
conduct with respect to the offerings. 48 The district judge had
granted summary judgment to Ough on the basis of his showing
that he had conformed to industry practice for municipal finance
professionals. 49 The court of appeals reversed, agreeing with the
SEC that "the standard of care by which Ough's conduct must be
measured is not defined solely by industry practice, but must be
judged by a more expansive standard of reasonable prudence, for
50
which the industry standard is but one factor to consider."
To reach this conclusion, the Ninth Circuit had to address
Ough's contention that he should receive the same treatment
that the court had afforded auditors in Arthur Young.5 1 The
court of appeals rejected Ough's argument, but in so doing
reaffirmed the central holding it had reached in Arthur Young:
There, we held that accountants who acted in accordance with
Generally Accepted Auditing Standards (GAAS) were not liable
under section 17(a), Secton 10(b) or Rule 10b-5, and that the
industry standard, namely compliance with GAAS, was the
relevant standard for measuring the accounts' [sic] conduct.
Arthur Young does not require us to hold that compliance with
an industry standard absolves a securities professional from
liability under federal securities laws. Our holding in Arthur
Young was made in the particular context of the accounting
profession. GAAS guidelines establish accounting standards
that are explicitly defined in authoritative, publicly available
we have noted, with reference to United States v. Simon, that in certain

circumstances generally accepted accounting principles will not immunize
an accountant if he consciously chose not to disclose a known material fact.
677 F.2d 1301, 1313 n.15 (9th Cir. 1982) (citations omitted).
45 254 F.3d 852 (9th Cir. 2001).
46 Id. at 854.
47 15 U.S.C. § 77q(a)(1) (2000).
48 Rauscher, 254 F.3d at 853.

49 Id. at 855.
50 Id. at 856.
51 590 F.2d 785 (9th Cir. 1979).
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pronouncements issued by recognized sources and utilized
throughout the accounting profession.5 2
Finding that there was no such time-honored, authoritative
industry standard of conduct for municipal finance professionals,
the court of appeals declined to treat the standards of that
industry as anything more than a "relevant factor" in assessing
reasonable prudence. 53 In so doing, the Ninth Circuit reinforced
the Second Circuit's statement in Simon that a GAAP defense
will be more persuasive where the applicable accounting
principles are clear. And, echoing the second limitation on
Simon, the Ninth Circuit reiterated that in Arthur Young it had
"declined to hold that compliance with GAAS alone would
immunize an accountant who failed to reveal material facts that
were known or which, but for a deliberate refusal to become
54
informed, should have been known."
V.

SIMON'S LEGACY

On one level, the certification provisions' standardless duty
of "fair presentation" is simply a statutory vessel that will have
to be filled by judicial construction. But the government and the
courts must be careful to fill that vessel in a way that leaves
businessmen and businesswomen with some meaningful
guidance as to what is, and is not, prohibited. As we have seen
from the foregoing discussion of Simon and Arthur Young, the
most that the existing antifraud case law would seem to support
is that GAAP governs financial disclosure if GAAP requires a
particular treatment. Where GAAP permits (but does not
require) a certain result, GAAP should nevertheless govern,
unless the party making the disclosure knows, or has
deliberately refused to become informed about, a fact that is so
material that GAAP compliance is effectively meaningless. 55 If

52

Rauscher, 254 F.3d at 857 (citations omitted).

53 Id.
54 Id. at n.4.
55 In a recent settled enforcement action, In re Dynegy Inc., Securities Act
Release No. 8134, Exchange Act Release No. 46537, AAER No. 1631 (Sept. 24,
2002), the SEC cited, in place of Simon, the Fourth Circuit's considerably more
recent opinion in Malone v. Microdyne Corp., 26 F.3d 471 (4th Cir. 1994), in which
the court observed that "'In some circumstances, courts have found defendants
liable for securities fraud under Rule 10b-5 despite having complied with GAAP."'
In re Dynegy Inc., at 9, quoting Malone, 26 F.3d at 478. Malone does not advance
the inquiry into when compliance with GAAP will be found sufficient in a fraud or a

20021

UNITED STATES V. SIMON

the SEC, or Congress, wish to move the law beyond the line
drawn in Simon, they should make the new standard clear. It is
bad regulatory and law enforcement policy to take the GAAP
standard away and leave persons facing criminal sanctions with
nothing. In particular, an empty formulation, such as the SEC's
statement in its Certification Release, that compliance with
GAAP "may not necessarily satisfy obligations under the
antifraud provisions" is not helpful, and may lead the
government to suffer needless judicial reverses as it attempts to
56
enforce the new law.

criminal case, and when it will not. The language quoted from Malone was pure
dictum; the issue before the Fourth Circuit in that case was whether a trial judge
had erred in granting defendants judgment as a matter of law in the face of expert
testimony adduced by the plaintiffs stating that the defendants had violated
Statement of Financial Accounting Standards No. 48 (Fin. Accounting Standards
Bd. 1981). Malone, 26 F.3d at 477-78. Moreover, the only authority that the Malone
court itself cited for the proposition that GAAP might be insufficient "in some
circumstances" was one of Simon's early progeny, Herzfeld v. Laventhol, Krekstein,
Horwath & Horwath, 378 F. Supp. 112, 121-22. See supra note 21. In Herzfeld, the
district court found that extended discussion of GAAP compliance "misse[d] the
point" where the defendant accountants had issued a report concluding that a
nursing home sale-the largest transaction in which the issuer had ever
participated-was a good sale, and permitting income from the transaction to be
recorded, when the accountants knew among other things: that neither the sale nor
the preceding purchase was recorded in the issuer's books; that the issuer would
have shown a loss if the income from the transactions were not realized; that the
issuer had not acquired title to the nursing home properties; that no deed, title
search, or title insurance had ever been obtained by the issuer; and that the legal
opinion on which the accountants relied had been obtained over the telephone from
an attorney who had neither seen the relevant contract, nor had it read to him over
the telephone. Id. at 121, 125-26. It is easy to see, in these facts, not only an
illustration of the second limitation discussed in text above (known, extraordinarily
material facts that make the question of GAAP compliance effectively meaningless),
but in all likelihood a GAAP violation as well.
56 See Banca Cremi v. Alex Brown & Sons, Inc., 132 F.3d 1017, 1035 (4th Cir.
1997); Upton v. SEC, 75 F.3d 92, 98 (2d Cir. 1996).
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